Massacre at Lafoole

By Daud Jimale

''With government approval, Cecchi prepared for an expedition into the interior. By November 25, he was ready to move; his caravan consisted of seventy askaris, Commander Ferdinando Maffei of the Staffetta, Commander Franscesco Mongiardini of the Volturno, and fourteen other Italians, for the most part members of the crews of the two ships. That very night their encampment at Lafolé, some twelve miles inland, was attacked. In the early morning hours, as the caravan once more got under way, it was attacked again. By eight-thirty in the morning of November 26, all but three sailors were dead or dying.'' ''First Adowa, then Lafole; the future of Italian colonialism in the Horn of Africa looked very unpromising at thend of 1896''[1]

The above event sparked one of the longest resistance struggles in Southern Somalia (Benadir) against Italian penetration and occupation of Somalia. This long resistance is only second to the heroic great struggle of Sayyid Muhammed Abdulle Hassan and his darawish army.What happened on that day of November 25-26th of 1896? Who was this Cecchi guy? Who were these mysterious warriors that swiftly defeated this first Italian colonial penetration of the hinterland of Benadir? Why is this event put in the same line as the humiliating defeat of the Italians by Ethiopians in Adowa? And last but not least, what were the consequences of this event in Lafole?

This episode in Somali history is perhaps the least known, although it had crucial impact on the future of Somalia. Most Somalis are not aware of this event while the Italians had built a monument for Antonio Cecchi in Lafole which still stands in the bush unvisited; while throughout the Banaadir 1896 was remembered in the count of the years as Axad Shiiki, the ‘Sunday Year of Cecchi’.

To present an elaborate account of this event, we need to start with the context. The historic setting in which it occurred, for example the conditions in Banadir region and the main groups in that region. The backgrounds of Italian colonial interest in Somalia and the role Antonio Cecchi played in this. Lastly, the consequences of the Lafole event are crucial for understanding the long resistance struggle waged by Somali groups in Banadir region against the Italian colonial penetration.

In this piece we’ll present the complete story, and will show the importance of this event and the shockwave it sent throughout Benadir and Southern Somalia.

1: Backrgound on Benadir region.

Benadir region consisted of the four Benadir ports of: Warsheekh, Mogadishu, Merca and Baraawe. These four port-cities were inhabited by Somali groups along with Arabs and people with mixed origins and traders from the Indian Ocean. The authority of Mogadishu for example was nominally under Omani rule, but the city had two real administrations, one in Xamarweyne and the other in Shangaani. These four Benadir ports were the linkages between the hinterlands of Somalia and the Indian Ocean trade. Caravan trade flourished in the hinterlands, connecting trade centres of Harar and Ogadeniya to Benadir ports, through the trade towns of Lugh, Baardheere and Geledi.
In the hinterland of Benadir diverse groups existed, like Geledi, Hintire, Wacdaan, Biyamaal, Murusade, Shidle etc.

The relevant groups in this event of “Axad Shiiki” are: Geledi Sultanate, Wacdaan, Biyamaal and Murusade.

The Geledi Sultanate

The Geledi Sultanate was a sultanate that came into existence when the clans of Geledi and Wacdaan made an alliance against the Silcis group who then ruled the Shabelle Valley[2]. After this successful revolt, the two clans lived together and linked their future which gradually led to the formation of the Geledi Sultanate. For two centuries or so the Geledi and their Wacdaan allies had formed a small independent state that prospered by trade, which they attempted to control, and had for a time held together a much wider clan ‘empire’. Virginia Luling says the following in her book titled: Somali Sultanate, The Geledy City-State over 150 years (2002):

In spite of the differences between them in way of life, language and traditions, Geledi and Wacdaan formed a close and lasting alliance. They were joined later – sometime early in the 19^th century – by a section of another Hawiye clan, the Murusade. They were granted land northeast of Geledi town, where they established four villages.

The Wacdaan

The Wacdaan is a Mudulood group that settled in Lower Shabelle as early as the 18th century. They were allied with Geledi and Murursade, and lived between Afgoye and the coast region around Mogadishu. Their deegaan (communal land) is described by Lee V. Cassanelli in his book titled: The Shaping of Somali Society, reconstructing the history of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900, as:

‘Between Afgoye and Muqdisho lay about twenty-five kilometres of thick brush and scrub grass. In the late nineteenth century, the area was inhabited by the camel-keeping Wacdaan clan, who had been close allies of the Geledi for the preceding hundred years’ (Lee V. Cassanneli, 1982, p.215)

The Biyamaal

The Biyamaal arrived in the Lower Shabelle around the end of 17th century and established control over Merca and the hinterlands. The Biyamaal were in constant war with the Geledi Sultanate, and even killed 2 Sultans of Geledi through out the war. The Biyamaal are perhaps the best known example of southern Somali resistance. Lee V. Cassanneli sheds light on the prowess of this clan:

‘Yet there is little question that the resistance in Marka district was the fiercest and most prolonged in the Benaadir. This is not surprising in light of the earlier history of the Biyamaal; their continual struggle against many enemies had given them a cohesiveness and military organization far tighter than that of the most other southern Somali clans.’ (Lee V. Cassanelli, 1982, p.22

The Murursade

The Murursade joined the alliance between Wacdaan and Geledi and was granted land northeast of Geledi town, where they established four villages.

2: Italian expansion into Benadir/Somalia

the Italian expansion into Somalia.

At the middle of the 19^th century Italy was eager to join the leagues of other European imperialist nations like Britain, France and Germany. To achieve this end they set their eyes on East Africa, and made their first incursion into Eritrea in which they acquired Massawa port.

Italian expansion in Somalia began in 1885, when Antonio Cecchi, an explorer led an Italian expedition into the lower Juba region and concluded a commercial treaty with the sultan of Zanzibar. In the beginning exploration missions were the only tangible signs of Italian successes in the Somali peninsula. Many negotiations with the Sultan of Zanzibar, who had shadowy sovereignty over the Benadir ports, failed. Robert L. Hess narrates of these failures, and the consequent frustrations the Italians experienced in their quest to exploit Somali lands, in his book titled: Italian Colonialism in Somalia (1966):

The Italians might well have become discouraged in their search for colonies in East Africa had not a sudden impetus come from a most unexpected quarter – northeastern Somalia. On December 12, 1888,  a delegation from Yusuf Ali, sultan of Obbia, arrived in Zanzibar and requested the protection of Italy. (Robert L. Hess, 1966, p.24-25)

In 1889, Italy established protectorates over the eastern territories then under the nominal rule of the sultans of Obbia and of Alula;

‘At the end of January Filonardi left for Obbia to arrange for the protectorate. On February 8, Yusuf Ali placed his sultanate under Italian protection in return for an annual subsidy of 1,200 Maria thalers. (Robert L. Hess, 1966, p25)

''The choice of Cecchi to head the mission was logical, for he had been active in the exploration of northeast Africa. In 1876 he had led an expedition from Zeila to the frontiers of Kaffa in southern Ethiopia. From that time he was an ardent partisan of Italian expansion into the horn. Cecchi was probably the first to succeed in directing Italian attention toward the Somali coast’’ (Robert L Hess, 1966, p.15)

A few years later Italy succeeded to lease the Banadir region from the sultan of Zanzibar, with Britain facilitating the negotiations between the two.

Antonio Cecchi's role in Italian expansion into the Horn:

As it already became clear, Antonio Cecchi spearheaded the Italian expansion into Somalia. He was chosen to lead the mission because of his past and reputation of being a supporter of Italian expansion into East Africa.

After he returned from the Lower Jubba region he became obsessed with Italian expansion into Somalia.

On the basis of his explorations and his often unfounded enthusiasm for the area, he insisted on the importance of the Juba River as the key to a much larger colonial program:..Once we acquire with certainty the knowledge that the Juba is navigable…then it is certain that it will become the most natural artery for the exportation of the abundant coffee harvest of Kaffa and the surrounding regions…Now that our Italy has established itself at Massawa…it is possible for Italy to extend its possessions toward the south…The Juba would thus mark the extreme southern boundary of our possessions. (Robert Hess, 1966)

Italy succeeded through negotiations with the Sultan of Zanzibar to sign commercial treaties with Zanzibar, which allowed Italy to trade with the Banadir region. This initial success was followed by long negotiations in which the Italians wanted to lease the Benadir region. After a while they succeeded in this too, and set up a commercial enterprise named after the Italian trader in East Africa Filonardi. Filonardi Company was lead by Filonardi himself and received some support from Italy in order to penetrate the Benadir and Somalia economically.

From 1893 to 1896, the Italian presence was limited to a small garrison of soldiers at Luuq on the upper Jubba River, and a few traders along the coast. The Italian outpost at Luuq had been established in 1895 to gather information on Somali trade in the region and to protect Italian interests in the face of Ethiopian claims to the area. ( Lee V. Cassanelli, 1982, p.201)

This insignificant presence of Italian commercial interests in Benadir can hardly be called ‘colonization’. There were a few Italian residents, and the police (askaris) were still Arab who did not go further than their garrisons. Because of this situation, most Somali groups were not pressed to fight this initial penetration since the intentions of Italians were still vague.

''Perhaps because of the Filonardi Company’s limited intervention in Somali affaires, there was only one notable incident of Somali hostility between 1893 and 1896. That occurred on 11 October 1893, the day the Italian flag was first raised over the Garesa in Marka. A Somali attacked and killed an Italian soldier; he in turn was killed with three shots from a ‘Wetterly’’ gun.’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli, 1982, p.202)

This was the setting in Somalia and Benadir, before Cecchi became dominant in convincing the Italian government to penetrate further into Somalia as he returned to Italy.

''On his return to Italy, however, Cecchi continued to pressure the government to tap the ‘’rich commercial resources’’ of Somalia (Cecchi, Pesaro, to foreign Minister C.F Nicolis di Robilant, August 27, 1886)

Antonio Cecchi was an ardent expansionist who for some time had been urging the Italian government to take over the Benaadir concessions. In seeking to promote his own version of Italian power in Somalia, Cecchi upset the fragile commercial arrangements that Filonardi had constructed. He replaced Filonardi’s influential Hadrami interpreter with Arabs of his own choosing, returned an unpopular Italian resident to Marka, and sent soldiers to the lower Jubba area to try to force Somali caravaneers to unload their wares at Baraawe rather than at the British-held ports of Kismaanyo and Goobweyn. (Lee V. Cassanelli)

Cecchi’s presence also resurrected Somali fears of territorial dispossession. Thus it did not escape public attention when a cousin of Cecchi visited the Benaadir in 1895 to investigate the possibilities for commercial agriculture. There soon followed talk of growing cotton on Italian plantations along the Shabeelle. This cousin was Giorgio Mylius, a wealthy Milanese industrialist. The Industrialist was particularly interested in the possibility of growing cotton in Somalia. Finally, Cecchi appeared to symbolize colonial aggressiveness in the distant interior

3: The Somali response to Italian expansion

The Somali groups described in part 1 responded differently to the Italians who were expanding slowly but steadily into Benadir coast, and would inevitably venture into the hinterlands.

To start with the Geledi Sultanate was in decline throughout the 19th century. The Sultanate was in the shadow of its former splendid and power. The Geledi confederation headed by the Gobroon shaykhs of Afgooye had lost much of its cohesiveness as the nineteenth century drew to a close. The succession of Osman Ahmed in the 1880s brought to the Geledi sultanate a man of lesser ambitions and more limited political skills than his illustrious forebears. Osman, for example, did nothing to punish the Biyamaal when they blocked a branch of the Shabeelle River and thus caused severe hardship to Geledi´s agricultural allies downriver. ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

Despite these setbacks, Osman inherited baraka (grace) as a member of the Gobroon lineage was still respected by many ordinary Somalis in the region. In the mid 1890s Osman´s army had still been strong enough to defeat their traditional Hintire rivals down the river. What was the view of the Sultan of the Italian expansion? First of all what was the general mood in Geledi?
Most people were suspicious of the Italian encroachments and as described earlier people were whispering about Italians taking over the land and their farms. When the Italians came, The Geledis were divided on the issue to resist the penetration of Italians of Benadir coast or accommodate. While the people wanted to resist, the attitude of the Sultan and those in authority was cautiously accommodating the Italian presence in Benadir Coast. The Geledi-Wacdaan alliance came under strain at this time, for many of the Wacdaan were opposed to any compromise with the foreigners.

The Sultan started to accommodate the Italians and he started to establish friendly relationships with the Italian governors in Mogadishu. Cecchi apparently felt that Osman remained a force to be reckoned with, for the ill-fated Lafoole expedition had originated with Cecchi´s scheme for an Italian-Geledi alliance ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

The Wacdaan

The Wacdaan were mainly pastoralist, with a small group turning to farming throughout the centuries of their alliance with the Geledi clan who were mainly agriculturalists. As said above, the Wacdaan were opposed to any compromise with the foreigners. This fierce anti-foreign stance was persistent in the culture of Wacdaan and in the very place of Lafoole. The place has been called Lafoole because apparently the Wacdaan defeated the Gaalo Madoow when they migrated to the Lower Shabelle around the 18th century, hence the translation of Lafoole which is: Bones. ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

Because the Sultan of Geledi seemed hesitant to resist the Italian expansion into Benadir coast, the alliance was cooled off. Apart from the weakening of their bonds with the Geledi, the drought of the 1890s which lead to a large population of Wacdaan abandoning their homelands, the Italians posed the greatest threat to the group. They were, moreover, the first inland Somalis whose territory was actually invaded by colonial soldiers at the time of the Cecchi expedition.

On of the most influential leaders among the Wacdaan was the leader Shaykh Ahmed Haji Mahhadi. He was not a Wacdaan but became the sheikh of the Wacdaan. He was born in Mogadishu and hailed from a lineage of Mogadishu (Abgal). He had lived there most of his life, teaching alongside such renowned Muslims scholars as Shaykh Sufi and Shaykh Mukhdaar. Like the latter, he found coexistence in a town which housed infidels intolerable, and he chose to retire to the small coastal enclave of Nimow, a little south of Mogadishu. There he set up a small jamaaca which attracted several of the local inhabitants. When Nimow was shelled by an Italian warship in retaliation for the Cecchi ambush, Ahmed Haji fled to Day Suufi (in the heart of Wacdaan territory) where he intensified his preaching against the infidels. As late as 1907, the acting Italian governor considered him ‘the most listened-to propagandist' in this area of the Shabeelle. Even the Geledi turned to him rather than to their sultan for religious counsel. ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

One of the Wacdaan leaders apparently influenced by Ahmed Haji was Hassan Hussein, titular head of the largest subsection of the Wacdaan clan, the Abubakar Moldheere. The Abubakar Moldheeres were the most numerous and hence the most militarily powerful section of the Wacdaan in the late nineteenth century. Hassan Hussein is remembered as one of the first Wacdaan to oppose the Italians: warriors from his lineage were prominent among the forces that attacked Cecchi at Lafoole. Likewise, his lineage was spokesmen for the Abubakar Moldheere who most strenuously urged the blockade of caravan routes to Mogadishu (economic sanctions).

The Biyamaal

This group is the best known group in the southern Somali resistance. Like the other groups in Benadir, the Biyamaal too were wary of Italian expansion into the Benadir coast. In the beginning the Biyamaal were following the actions of the Italians very carefully, while trying to accommodate them if they posed no threat. Yet there is little question that the resistance in Merca district was the fiercest and most prolonged in the Benadir. This is not surprising in light of the earlier history of the Biyamaal: their continual struggle against many enemies had given them a cohesiveness and a military organization far tighter than that of most other southern Somali clans ( Lee V. Cassanelli).Throughout the nineteenth century the Biyamaal had stood together to defend their territory and their independence against encroachments by the powerful sultans of Geledi: both Yusuf Muhammad and his son Ahmed Yusuf lost their lives in battle against the Biyamaal. These proud nomads had also firmly resisted the sultan of Zanzibar´s growing influence in Merca by ambushing the governor of that town together with forty askaris in 1876 ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

Not only by sheer force were the Biyamaal able to resist the influence of the sultan of Zanzibar but they could also assure their influence on Merca by placing economic sanctions on the city. When occasional differences arose between the Biyamaal leadership in the interior and the old Arab and Somali families of Merca – who were always more interested than Biyamaal in establishing relations with foreign powers – the Biyamaal would hold up food supplies to the townsmen and divert their exports to smaller outlets along the coast. These boycotts proved extremely effective in assuring Biyamaal influence in urban politics, as the Italians would learn in 1904.

The Biyamaal consisted of four territorial sections spread along the coastal dunes between Jesiira and Mungiya and extending inland to the farmlands along the Shabelle. Each of these sections was represented by a number of religious authorities known generally as macaallimiin and by a number of politico-military figures known as malaakhs and amaanduule. In times of crises, the leaders from all four sections would gather in shir to work out a common policy of action.

With the arrival of the Italians at the coast in 1890, Biyamaal leaders were almost in constant shir to coordinate their plans for the inevitable showdown between Italian expansion and their resistance. The Italian government always viewed them as its most determined opponent; colonial policy was geared towards the dividing of the Biyamaal leadership and thus to weaken the opposition. Remarkably the Biyamaal have presented a united front even when they were eventually defeated in 1908.

-----

The setting of 'Axad Shiiki' is complete; it is time to discuss that very day of 25th November of 1896 and the morning of 26th November of 1896.

What happened on those two days? Who attacked and annihilated the Italian expedition force? And how did this event spark the fire of resistance in the whole of Banadir which would last till 1908?

4. The spark that lit the Resistance: Lafoole 25-26th of November 1896

Lafoole as explained earlier was within Wacdaan territory. It lay in an area with thick brush and scrub grass, a suitable spot for a well-prepared ambush. The Wacdaan were waiting for this moment, as Cecchi was despised by all Somali groups in the Benadir, since he embodied colonial aggressiveness which became evident by his plans to ‘tap into the rich resources of Somalia’.

Also, the Wacdaan were from the beginning fiercely opposed to any compromise with the 'infidels'. This attitude was persistent in the culture of Wacdaan as explained earlier. Another impulse to this fierce anti-infidel attitude was the coming of Sheik Axmed Xaaji, the sheikh that found it intolerable to coexist with the 'infidels' in Mogadishu (see previous chapter). He lived among the Wacdaan, set up a jamaaca (religious school) and became the sheikh of the Wacdaan (religious leader). His ideas have apparently influenced the leader of the largest subgroup of Wacdaan (Abubakar Moldheere): Hassan Hussein.

Hassan Hussein, together with Sheikh Axmed Xaaji, was instrumental in articulating the opposition to the Italian presence in Benadir. As already explained this too had its consequences for the political geography in Benadir, mainly the cooling of the alliance between Geledi and Wacdaan. Within the Geledi, the people wanted to resist the Italian expansion but the Sultan and the ones with authority choose for accommodation. In this the Wacdaan were slowly moving away from Geledi, and moving towards the Biyamaal, their erstwhile enemy.

The clash at Lafoole:

On 25th of November in 1896, the moment arrived in which the Italian government gave the approval to venture into the interior, thus effectively leaving the garrisons in Mogadishu. Cecchi too was waiting for this moment since he was eager to sign treaties with the Sultan of Geledi, which he still thought was powerful enough to be instrumental in the Italian plans for Somalia. What he didn’t know however was that the Sultan did not represent the feelings of the people, who were fiercely opposed to Italian expansion. Cecchi and the others in the expedition would find out too late about this fierce anti-infidel attitude of the Somalis.

This expedition consisted of Antonio Cecchi, Commander Ferdinando Maffei of the Staffetta, Commander Franscesco Mongiardini of the Volturno, and fourteen other Italians. In the evening when the expedition force set their camp at Lafoole, they were attacked in which a fierce fight followed. Apparently, this attack was not decisive enough to finish off the expedition. The next morning a renewed attack followed which successfully finished off the expedition, with only 3 survivors to tell the story.

''With government approval, Cecchi prepared for an expedition into the interior. By November 25, he was ready to move; his caravan consisted of seventy askaris, Commander Ferdinando Maffei of the Staffetta, Commander Franscesco Mongiardini of the Volturno, and fourteen other Italians, for the most part members of the crews of the two ships. That very night their encampment at Lafolé, some twelve miles inland, was attacked. In the early morning hours, as the caravan once more got under way, it was attacked again. By eight-thirty in the morning of November 26, all but three sailors were dead or dying.'' (Robert. L Hess, 1966, p.63)

Who were these groups that attacked the Italian expedition?

In the Shaping of Somali Society, (Lee V. Cassanelli) it becomes clear that the group that attacked the Italians were of mainly Wacdaan warriors, accompanied by Murusade and Geledi warriors.

''In November 1896, he and a score of Arab askaris set out to meet with the presumably influential sultan of Geledi. It was the first colonial attempt to penetrate the interior with a military contingent, and it ended disastrously for the Italians. Cecchi’s expedition was besieged and most of it destroyed at a place called Lafoole, along the Muqdisho-Afgooye road by Somali warriors of the Wacdaan clan. (Lee V. Cassanneli, 1982, p.203-204)''

In another passage the author reveals more about the composition:

''Geledi’s long-time allies the Wacdaan had apparently acted independently at Lafoole; and they had been assisted by a handful of warriors from the Murusade, also Geledi allies (Lee V. Cassanneli, 1982, p/209-210)''

Virginia Luling instead talks about Wacdaan and others, which thus means Murusade and Geledi warriors, since the alliance consisted of these three groups:

''…Antonio Cecchi, famous as an explorer and one of the most enthusiastic and influential advocates of Italian colonisation, set out from Muqdisho for Geledi with a party of soldiers in November 1896, intending to negotiate with Sultan Cusmaan Axmed. They were surprised and attacked while camping in Wacdaan territory, at Laafoole at the edge of the deex, where the white earth meets the black, and the thorny bush gives way to more open country. Out of the seventeen Italians, only three survived.The assailants were from the Wacdaan and perhaps other clans. (Virginia Lulling, 2002, p.30)''

Virginia Luling further sheds light on the location of Laafoole:

''It must be a particularly suitable place for surprise attacks, for fourteen years earlier, Révoil’s caravan had been attacked by Wacdaan at the same spot, and its name ‘place of bones’, comes from a much earlier slaughter, supposedly of the ‘gaalo madow’. (Virginia Lulling, 2002, p.30)''

------
Reactions to the clash:

The ‘Lafoole Massacre’ as the Italian press called it, came less than a year after the humiliating Italian defeat at Adowa in Ethiopia. It was a severe physiological damage to Italian colonial ambitions.

For Somalis, it was a great day, which sent a shockwave throughout the Benadir region. The 'Lafoole Massacre' which already severely shocked the Italian colonialists, was immediately followed by sporadic incidents along the whole Benadir coast.

In Mogadishu 100 or more Italians were wounded in a general uprising. In Merca, a young Somali, Omar Hassan Yusuf, assassinated the Italian resident, Giacomo Trevis. According to local accounts, Omar emerged after praying in the small mosque of Shaykh Osman ‘Marka-yaalle’ and knifed the ‘infidel’ Trevis as he walked along the beach. Giacomo Trevis was a hated man in Merca for a lot of reasons, besides being an unwanted colonialist; he was also hated for his policy of compulsory labour. In Warsheekh, a government askari was confronted as he stepped outside the garrison. In Baraawe, the well-known and influential Haji Shaykh Abbas railed against his Somali compatriots and called them ‘woman’ for allowing the Italians free movement there. (Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Italians in Benadir were shocked, and when the news reached Rome, the foreign minister immediately appointed Commander Giorgio Sorrentino as royal commissioner extraordinary for the Benadir. Initially, the Italians thought that Lafoole was an Ethiopian ambush since Ethiopians were besieging Lugh at that time and since there were rumours of an Ethiopian invasion of Benadir. When Sorrentino landed in Mogadishu, on 26th of January 1897, he immediately started the investigation of Lafole.

''Within ten days he had determined that Lafolé was neither the precursor of a general uprising against the Italians nor an Ethiopian ambush but an isolated case of action by Wacdaan tribesmen and the tribes of Geledi; who had been spurred to the act by two Arabs from Mogadishu’’ (Robert L. Hess, 1966, p.65)

This was a gross understatement of the Lafoole incident, and the attitude of the Benadir groups to the Italian presence.

Throughout the Benadir, from Warsheekh to well south of Marka, 1896-97 is remembered as Axad Shiiki (the ‘Sunday year of Cecchi’). The Biyamaal date the beginning of their twelve-year resistance at Axad Shiiki.

‘Like the Italians, the Somalis viewed the Lafoole incident as a watershed in the history of the relationship between the two countries. Throughout the Benaadir, from Warsheikh to well south of Merca, 1896-97 is remembered as Axad Shekki (the ‘Sunday year of Cecchi’). The Biyamaal date the beginning of their twelve-year resistance at Axad Shekki. (Lee V. Cassanneli, 1982, p.207).

The clash at Lafoole is immortalized by this shirib (saying):

Shiin digow Sheikh Axmed Xaaji; Shiiki sheydaan mooho?

Translation:  Writer of (the Koranic verse) shiin, Sheikh Axmed Xaaji ;Is not Cecchi a devil?

Sheikh Axmed Xaaji is the well-known religious leader of the Wacdaan who had established the jamaaca to teach Quran, religion etc

----------------------------------------

As became apparent earlier, The Italians misinterpreted the signs of the coming storm which would engulf the Benadir region.

In the coming part, we will shed light on the immediate consequences of the clash at Lafoole. How the Italians reacted to the 'Lafoole Massacre' and how the different Somali groups in Benadir reacted to the event and the wider issue of Italian presence in Benadir coast. Slowly, from there on, we will arrive at the heroic struggle of the Biyamaal and their allies, amongst which their erstwhile enemy Wacdaan, against the Italian expansion.

''Obituary: Antonio Cecchi The Geographical Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Feb., 1897), p. 230. Jstor Antonio Cecchi. The well-known Italian explorer, Antonio Cecchi, has, together with various officers and men of the Italian gunboats Volturno and Stafletta, lately fallen a victim to the treachery of the Somalis of the Benadir coast, of which he was administrator. During a trip towards the Webi Shebeli, the party was suddenly attacked by night, and, after expending most of its ammunition, was obliged to beat a retreat, amidst renewed attacks by the Somalis. All the officers lost their lives,and only three men succeeded in reaching Mogdishu. Cecchi was best known for his journey to Abyssinia and the Galla countries between the years 1877 and 1882. The expedition, as at first constituted, was nominally under the command of the Marquis Antinori, Cecchi being entrusted with the astronomical and meteorological observations ; but of the five Europeans who took part in it, only Cecchi and Dr. Chiarini proceeded beyond Shoa, the latter subsequently dying of fever,while the former spent several years as a prisoner in the southern Galla countries before returning to the coast. The results of this journey were published in two octavo volumes at Rome in 1886, followed in 1887 by a third dealing with thetopographical surveys. Cecchi was afterwards for some years Italian consul at Aden, and since 1890 had held a similar post at Zanzibar, where he was universally respected and beloved.

The Italian expansion which culminated in their first expedition into the interior of Banadir was successfully halted a mere 12 miles out of the city and lead to the death of the man who spearheaded Italian expansion into Somalia. In the coming instalments we'll show how the Somali groups in Banadir first viewed the slow Italian encroachment on the Benadir coast and how the Lafole event sparked the fire of a long resistance in Banadir and Southern Somalia.

	SOMALIS TO BE PUNISHED. ___________ For the Murder of Italians at Magadoxo, Africa. Rome, Dec. 3.—In the chamber of Deputies today the Marquis Visconti Venosti, Minister of Foreign Affaires, confirmed the reports from Zanzibar of the murder of the Italian Consul, Signor Cecchi, the Captains, and a number of officers of the Italian warships Volturno and Staffeta, and the wounding of 100 or more other Italians by Somalis at Magadoxo. The men had fallen into an ambuscade and were attacked without warning. The Government , the Minister said, would take energetic measures to punish the Somalis who were guilty of the outrage. The Marquis said that the confirmatory reports showed that fourteen Italians had been killed, together with a number of the escorts of the Italians whose caravan was attacked during the night. Twenty-seven bodies were recovered by a rescue party when hurried to the scene from Magadoxo when the news of fighting reached there. The rescuers arrested a number of the Somalis who participated in the massacre and punished them appropriately. Many of the Somalis tribesmen were also killed by the Italians in the fight that followed the attack on the caravan. The New York Times Published: December 4, 1986 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.h ... 94679ED7CF

5:The Storm of the Resistance gathers strength

As became clear from the NY times report (see table above) on the ‘Lafole Massacre’, the Italian minister of Foreign Affairs commented on the ‘Lafole Massacre’ that the Italian government would take ‘energetic measures’ to punish the Somalis who were 'guilty of the outrage'.
----
Now let us discuss these ‘energetic measures’ the Italian government wanted to take, and see whether they could had stemmed the coming tide of the monsoon storm of resistance headed towards the Benadir coast region. As mentioned in part 4, the Italian foreign minister immediately appointed Commander Giorgio Sorrentino as royal commissioner extraordinary for the Benadir. His mission was as Robert L. Hess writes in his book ‘Italian colonialism in Somalia’:

''Sorrentino was instructed 'above all to provide for the security and tranquillity of the region’ After a complete investigation of the causes of the attack at Lafole, he was to take whatever steps should appear indispensable for our dignity and for the security of the colony’’

This investigation would be completed within ten days which was around February 1897 (see part 4).
The conclusion Sorrentino drew was that the guilty ones were Wacdaan tribesmen and the tribes of Geledi, which meant that these tribesmen would be punished as the Italian foreign minister said in the NY Times report. Also Sorrentino believed that these tribesmen have been spurred to the act by two Arabs from Mogadishu. These Arabs were Abu Bakr Bin Awod, Filonardi’s interpreter and a certain Islam bin Muhammed.
The first thing, Sorrentino did was arresting Abu Bakr, while Islam bin Muhammed disappeared from the Benadir coast. The second thing, Sorrentino did was to plan a punitive expedition against the Somalis who were 'guilty of the outrage'. For this he had ordered two companies of Eritrean askaris. In the meantime, Sorrentino researched the conditions prevailing in the Benadir, where he discovered the widespread practice of slavery and domestic servitude. But he could not do something about it, since obviously this meant disturbing the whole plantation economy of the South.

''Under the circumstances-the already difficult relations with the interior tribes- Neither Dulio nor Sorrentino could act immediately against slavery. Such action would have committed the Italians to a costly undertaking of doubtful outcome, a risk that Sorrentino had been ordered not to take.’’ (Robert L. Hess, 1966, p.65)

Sorrentino and Dulio, the Benadir Company's commissioner, had to content themselves with the expected punitive expedition against the tribes in the interior. Sorrentino was pleased at the prospect of this punitive expedition as he thought of the Somalis as: ‘liars, thieves, and murderers’ A clear grudge from the ‘Lafole massacre’
He wrote in his book Ricordi del Benadir:

‘We’ve got a nasty cat to skin! May God protect us’ (Robert L. Hess, 1966, p.66)

In March the reinforcements of the two companies of Eritrean askaris finally arrived, and the Italians completed their plans for the punitive expedition against the Wacdaan and Geledi.
On April 20, almost 5 months after the Lafole attack, Sorrentino led his expedition inland and burned first Lafole and then several other villages associated with the Geledi and Murusade clan. The religious settlement of Nimow from where Sheekh Axmed Xaaji preached his religious message, was also bombarded by an Italian warship.

''The Italian bombardment of the small coastal village of Nimow in retaliation for Cecchi’s death marked the first such colonial action against a Somali civilian population.’’( Lee V. Cassanelli, 1982, p.208).

The Italians were joyful about these ‘energetic measures’ against the Somalis who were found guilty. Surprisingly, the Italians thought that these measures would solve everything and concluded that the Sorrentino expedition was a success:

''With Abu Bakr arrested, the Ethiopians in voluntary retreat, Lafole avenged, and leaders of Somali opposition deported, Sorrentino had virtually accomplished his mission by the end of April’’ (Robert L. Hess, 1966, p.66)

The deported leaders were Hussein Dera of Mogadishu and other Somalis for collaboration with the Ethiopians and instigation of Somali attacks on trading caravans between Lugh and the Coastal towns. Although these punitive expeditions looked impressive, they had no lasting effect, as it further antagonized the Wacdaan and Geledi clans. Also, it became clear that the two Arabs had no influence whatsoever on the clans of the interior, and thus were not the source of opposition to the Italian presence.

''The impression made by the punitive expedition after Lafolé could hardly have been called lasting'' (Robert L. Hess, 1966, p.76)

This seems to be the case, since the Italians retreated to the coastal cities after the expedition.

''In the decade following the Lafoole incident, the Italians remained at the coast, their colonial policy marked by uncertainty and indecision. Their only major venture into the interior was the establishment of a garrison of Arab soldiers at Baardheere in 1902’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli, 1982, p.204).

Also, in the book 'Italian colonialism in Somalia' of Robert L Hess, it becomes clear that the punitive expedition to avenge the Lafole attack was not followed by other expeditions into the interior.

''We make no expeditions against tribes guilty (of hostilities) but arrest individuals of that tribe who happen to be in town; (this policy) has persuaded the Bimal and the Somali of Mogadishu that we are not strong'' (Robert L. Hess, 1966, p.76)

It thus becomes clear that the Italians retreated back to the Coast, and only were visible in the cities of Merca, Mogadishu, Barawe and Warsheekh.

In Somali Sultanate, Virginia Luling also talks about the consequences of Lafole attack, in which she writes:

''On the Italian side, though the repercussions of the disaster delayed by three years the formation of the Benadir Company, in the long run it reinforced the conviction that it was necessary to take military control of the hinterland. (Virginia Lulling, 2002, p.31)’’

What made the punitive expedition not effective on the long run? Why did the Italians retreat to the Coast?
To answer these questions we need to know how the different Somali groups in Benadir responded to the Lafole attack.

''It is clear from colonial reports and from Somali oral recollections that Lafoole precipated a response from all the districts of the hinterland'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli, 1982, p.208).

-------------

-To start with the Geledi Sultanate
The Sultan of Geledi, Sultan Osman, as already discussed in the previous parts, wanted to accomodate the Italian presence on the Benadir coast. Cecchi apparently went to conclude a treaty with the Sultan, in order to penetrate the interior of the Benadir region. The Lafole episode came suddenly, and the Italians mounted their revenge expedition. As a consequence, Sultan Osman quickly succumbed to the Italian pressure and signed a treaty of peace with the Italians.

''The encounter with the Italians subdued the sultan of Geledi, who quickly signed a treaty of peace and pledged obedience to the Italian government'' (Robert L. Hess, 1966, p.66).

This however did not mean that the Geledi people supported the Italian penetration of the Benadir coast, or accepted the Sultan's treaty with the Italians.
The young people of Geledi were fiercely opposed to the Italians and also played a role in the Lafoole attack.

''Acting-Governor Dulio felt that the young men of Geledi were fiercely opposed to the Italian presence, whereas their elders wanted some sort of accommodation'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli, 1982, p.209).

Besides the young men, the uncle of Sultan Osman, and others felt that if the sultan wavered in his resistance, Gobroon authority would be weakened for good. This was true, since many from Adawiin lineage, whose religious prestige among the Geledi was second only to the Gobroon, preached a policy of non-accommodation.
The reasons why the Sultan of Geledi succumbed to the Italians were varied. One of them was that Sultan Osman himself considered the possibility of shoring up his waning power through an alliance with the Italians.

The only articulated fierce opposition to the Italians from the Geledi was from the leader of a jamaaca (religious settlement) of the Ahmediya. This leader was Shaykh Abiker Ali Jelle, a member of the sultan’s own Gobroon lineage.

''When Abiker began to preach outright opposition to the colonials sitting threateningly on the coast, he was forced by the Geledi elders to leave the district’’( Lee V. Cassanelli).

This shows on which side the elders stood, and how they along with the Sultan were hesitant to join the resistance and thought accommodation was the best option for the group’s interest. We will see in later instalments whether this actually was the case.

-The Wacdaan response

As already discussed in the previous parts, the Wacdaan were from the beginning fiercely opposed to the Italian penetration of the Benadir. This fierce opposition culminated in the attack of Lafole, in which mainly Wacdaan warriors along with a few Murusade and Geledi warriors, attacked the Cecchi expedition and killed all but three men.
The Italians directed their anger and revenge on mainly this group, by burning Lafole to the ground and bombarding the coastal village of Nimow from the sea. The Sorrentino expedition, with the Italian troops already based in Benadir port-cities and the reinforcements of the two Eritrean Askari companies, was also mainly directed at punishing the Wacdaan and their allies.

These punitive measures however did not subdue the Wacdaan. Instead the Wacdaan remained harassing Italian presence on the Benadir coast by attacking caravans to the Benadir port-cities, organising blockades of the caravan routes that went through their territory to Mogadishu.

''Now the Wacdaan were beginning to blockade the caravan routes that ran through their territory to the coast'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Italians sought to divide the Wacdaan and persuade sections of the group to submit peacefully. As said earlier the most numerous and militarily strongest section of Wacdaan, the Abubakar (Abukar?) Moldheere were lead by the famous Hassan Hussein, the fierce anti-‘infidel’ leader who along with Sheekh Axmed Xaaji articulated the opposition to the Italian penetration of the Benadir coast. This section of Wacdaan could not be persuaded, and continued to fight the Italians to the bitter end. The other section, the Mahad Moldheere, began slowly to depart from the rest of Wacdaan. They too participated in the Lafole attack, but started to move to the side of the Geledi. This was not suprising since they inhabited the territory contiguous to Afgooye and the fertile lands around Adadleh.

''Their interests coincided more with those of the agricultural Geledi. However, their smaller numbers gave them less influence in Wacdaan clan councils, which came to assume greater importance for policymakers as the Wacdaan began to act independently of the Geledi. While the Mahad Moldheere apparently cooperated in the Lafoole siege, their leader Abiker Ahmed Hassan subsequently struck an independent diplomatic stance.’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

When in 1899 the Italians demanded forty hostages to be surrendered to the authorities in Muqdisho as a sign of Wacdaan submission, only the Mahad Moldheere responded. Their leader Abiker became a stipended official, which enhanced his standing among those of pacific persuasion.
The Abubakar Moldheere refused to send the twenty representatives demanded of them and for some years remained openly defiant of Italian authority.

''They continued to attack caravans and occasionally to boycott the market of Muqdisho. There is some evidence to suggest that feuding within the Wacdaan increased after this rift between the two major lineages’( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Biyamaal response

The Biyamaal were one of the first group to express their support for the Wacdaan in the lafole attack. They boycotted the markets of Merca, and the northern Biyamaal even collaborated with Hassan Husein of the Wacdaan. This collaboration led to the Biyamaal becoming also a target of punitive expeditions.

''After the Lafoole episode, several Biimaal sections boycotted the market of Marka to express their support for the Wacdaan action. The northern Biimaal collaborated with Hassan Hussein of Lafoole in cutting off land communications between Muqdisho and Marka.'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli, 1982, p.224).

The Italians also targeted the Biyamaal for their support to the Wacdaan. In this they seized Jeziira, 13 miles south of Mogadishu.

These were the immediate responses of the Italian colonialists and the different Somali groups to the Lafole battle.

These actions and reactions would accelerate in the coming years, as the Italians were determined to colonize Benadir coast as the springboard for the eventual colonization of the rest of Southern Somalia. In this, the Italians would target the two fiercest resistance groups in the Benadir: the Wacdaan and Biyamaal, who were already, allied in their economic sanctions and operations to disturb the lines of supplies and communication of the Italians in Mogadishu.

References:

- Italian colonialism in Somalia, Robert Hess, 1966
- The Shaping of Somali Society, Reconstructing the history of a Pastoral people, 1600-1900, Lee V. Cassanelli, 1982

---

[1] Italian Colonialism in Somalia, Robert L. Hess 1966.

[2] Lee V. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society, reconstructing the history of a pastoral people, 1600-1900. 1982